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Abstract
Background: Prior analyses demonstrated the need for some countries and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
(GPEI) to conduct additional supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) with trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV)
prior to globally-coordinated cessation of all serotype 2-containing OPV (OPV2 cessation) to prevent the creation of
serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreaks after OPV2 cessation. The GPEI continues to
focus on achieving and ensuring interruption of wild poliovirus serotype 1 (WPV1) and making vaccine choices that
prioritize bivalent OPV (bOPV) for SIAs, nominally to increase population immunity to serotype 1, despite an
aggressive timeline for OPV2 cessation.
Methods: We use an existing dynamic poliovirus transmission model of northwest Nigeria and an integrated global
model for long-term poliovirus risk management to explore the impact of tOPV vs. bOPV vaccine choices on
population immunity and cVDPV2 risks.
Results: Using tOPV instead of bOPV for SIAs leads to a minimal decrease in population immunity to transmission
of serotypes 1 and 3 polioviruses, but a significantly higher population immunity to transmission of serotype 2
polioviruses. Failure to use tOPV in enough SIAs results in cVDPV2 emergence after OPV2 cessation in both the
northwest Nigeria model and the global model. Despite perceptions to the contrary, prioritizing the use of bOPV
over tOPV prior to OPV2 cessation does not significantly improve serotype 1 population immunity to transmission.
Conclusions: Immunization leaders need to focus on all three poliovirus serotypes to appropriately manage the
risks of OPV cessation in the polio endgame. Focusing on population immunity to transmission to interrupt WPV1
transmission and manage pre-OPV cessation risks of cVDPVs, all countries performing poliovirus SIAs should use
tOPV up until the time of OPV2 cessation, after which time they should continue to use the OPV vaccine formulation
with all remaining serotypes until coordinated global cessation of those serotypes.
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Background
National immunization programs and the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative (GPEI) continue to manage risks
associated with the polio endgame, including the risks of
using oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) to end all transmis-
sion of wild polioviruses (WPVs). The GPEI currently
plans to globally-coordinate cessation of all serotype-2
containing OPV (i.e., OPV2 cessation) according to an
aggressive timeline with a target date of April 2016 [1].
Prior modeling studies demonstrated the need for
sufficient supplemental immunization activities (SIAs)
with OPV prior to globally-coordinated OPV cessation
to prevent the creation of circulating vaccine-derived
poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks after OPV cessation [2–
6]. The planned addition of a single dose of inactivated
poliovirus vaccine (IPV) given at the time of the third
trivalent (tOPV) dose of routine immunization (RI) for
countries currently using OPV-only for immunization
[1] appears to offer only marginal benefits for areas most
at risk of cVDPVs after OPV cessation [3]. While clinical
trials suggest that IPV boosts intestinal immunity more
than OPV in individuals with prior immunity induced* Correspondence: kimt@kidrisk.org
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by a live poliovirus (LPV, i.e., WPV, OPV, cVDPV, or any
OPV-related viruses) [7, 8], models consistent with this
observation at the individual level show a minimal im-
pact of IPV on immunity to poliovirus transmission at
the population level [3, 5, 6]. This occurs because while
IPV protects individual vaccine recipients from develop-
ing paralysis if they become infected with an LPV, IPV
use leads to relatively little impact on fecal-oral polio-
virus transmission in previously susceptible individuals
and therefore in populations with conditions conducive
to fecal-oral poliovirus transmission. Conditions associ-
ated with relatively higher-income countries (i.e., low
population density, good hygiene, relatively greater role
of oropharyngeal transmission) [9] increase the relative
impact of IPV on population immunity to poliovirus
transmission, but the minimal conditions for IPV to pro-
vide sufficient population immunity to prevent poliovirus
transmission remain uncertain. The recent experience
with WPV1 transmission in Israel despite high RI cover-
age with IPV provided valuable context [10].
Following a shift in GPEI policy that began in the mid-
2000s from exclusive use of tOPV to the use of monova-
lent OPV (mOPV) in SIAs in endemic countries with
the expectation that using mOPV serotype 1 (mOPV1)
would soon stop wild poliovirus (WPV) serotype 1
(WPV1) transmission in endemic areas [11], OPV for-
mulation vaccine choices for SIAs became an important
factor in the overall population immunity to transmis-
sion for each of the three poliovirus serotypes. The GPEI
and some statistical analyses [12, 13] define population
immunity as vaccine-induced immunity to disease among
children under 5 years of age with non-polio acute flaccid
paralysis. This characterization of population immunity to
disease does not account for immunity derived from ex-
posure to LPVs in the environment and it ignores the con-
tributions to transmission of individuals of all ages
immune to disease who can still participate in asymptom-
atic transmission [14]. The resulting vaccine choices for
SIAs focus on the premise that competition between sero-
types in tOPV in individuals leads to “vaccine failure” for
serotypes 1 and 3 due to relatively lower take rates for in-
dividuals receiving tOPV than for those receiving mOPV
[11, 13, 15]. In contrast with this individual vaccine-
induced characterization of population immunity, our
characterization of population immunity to poliovirus
transmission uses a dynamic disease model to characterize
immunity to poliovirus transmission of all three serotypes
for all individuals in the entire population based on their
exposure history to vaccines and circulating LPVs and fo-
cuses on the level of population immunity needed to stop
viral transmission [9, 14].
Despite high expectations, the single serotype (mOPV1)
strategy failed to achieve WPV1 interruption and led to
outbreaks with serotype 3 WPV (WPV3), which then
motivated the introduction of serotype 3 monovalent
OPV (mOPV3) followed by bivalent OPV (bOPV, sero-
types 1 and 3) for SIAs. Recent modeling suggested that
the strategy pursued (i.e., the introduction of mOPVs then
bOPV) delayed the interruption of WPVs in India [5].
Continued failures to achieve and maintain high popula-
tion immunity to transmission delay eradication and allow
WPV importations and cVDPV emergences and importa-
tions to cause outbreaks [16]. Despite the somewhat lower
relative take rates for serotypes 1 and 3 characterized as
“vaccine failure” for tOPV, the experience and models of
the last endemic areas in which clusters of under-
vaccinated children repeatedly miss immunizations and
sustain WPV transmission suggests that “failure to vaccin-
ate” represents the fundamental problem [4–6, 17], con-
firmed for Nigeria recently by a subsequent independent
analysis [18]. For example, despite the large numbers of
SIAs conducted each year in northwest Nigeria, between
2010 and 2014, 47 % (121/256) of all confirmed WPV1,
WPV3, and cVDPV2 cases reported receipt of 2 OPV
doses or fewer, which may include some heterotypic OPV
doses (e.g., bOPV doses received by patients paralyzed by
cVDPV2).
Modeling particularly indicates the need for more
tOPV SIAs to prevent serotype 2 cVDPV (cVDPV2) out-
breaks after OPV2 cessation [4]. The GPEI continues to
focus on achieving and ensuring interruption of WPV1
transmission and making vaccine choices that prioritize
the use of bOPV for SIAs, nominally to increase population
immunity to disease for serotype 1, despite an aggressive
timeline for OPV2 cessation. However, achieving and main-
taining polio eradication requires permanently stopping
and preventing transmission, which requires a focus on
population immunity to transmission, not a focus on popu-
lation immunity to disease. This paper aims to explore the
trade-offs in population immunity to transmission for the
three poliovirus serotypes for tOPV or bOPV use in SIAs.
Methods
We use an existing differential equation-based dynamic
poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model [9]
(i.e., the DEB model) to characterize the impacts of dif-
ferent vaccine choices for SIAs in northwest Nigeria [4,
6, 17, 19] and an integrated global model of long-term
poliovirus risk management (i.e., the global model) [20]
to explore the impacts of tOPV vs. bOPV vaccine
choices on global population immunity to poliovirus
transmission and cVDPV risks. Briefly, the DEB model
dynamically tracks individuals as they move between im-
munity states because they acquire immunity from ma-
ternal antibodies, successful IPV vaccination, successful
OPV vaccination or infection due to contact with an
OPV vaccine recipient, or other LPV exposure, and lose
immunity in the absence of further vaccinations or
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infections due to waning. We define successful vaccin-
ation as receipt of a vaccine that “takes” (i.e., typically
approximated by seroconversion as measured in clinical
trials), with take rates that depend on the vaccine and
setting. We determined situation-specific average per-
dose take rates for all available poliovirus vaccines by
model calibration within ranges from the literature [9,
21]. In some cases, this included adjustments to account
for study limitations (e.g., different settings and vaccines
used in clinical trials than in the modeled population,
possible interference with maternal antibodies or sec-
ondary OPV infections with study results). In the DEB
model, cVDPVs emerge when population immunity to
transmission becomes so low that OPV-related viruses
introduced through RI or SIAs can sustain transmission
in the population and evolve to successive reversion
stages with increasingly high basic reproduction num-
bers (R0 values) and paralysis-to-infection ratios (PIRs).
When the prevalence in the last of 20 reversion stages
chosen to adequately represent the OPV evolution
process [9, 22] exceeds a given transmission threshold,
then fully-reverted VDPVs with assumed equal R0 and
PIR as homotypic WPV circulate in the population and
a cVDPV outbreak can occur.
We characterize population immunity to poliovirus
transmission in two different but related ways [4, 6]. The
mixing-adjusted effective immunity proportion (EIPM)
represents the proportion of immune individuals in a
population, weighted by the relative potential contribu-
tion to transmission for their immunity state and the ex-
tent to which they mix with other age groups or
connected subpopulations. If EIPM remains above its
threshold EIP* = 1/(1-R0), then transmission eventually
stops, while for EIPM < EIP* transmission can continue
and imported viruses can establish transmission. How-
ever, because EIP* depends on R0, which changes over
time and varies by serotype and setting, for this analysis
we focus on the mixing-adjusted net reproduction number
(Rn), which equals R0 × (1-EIP) and represents the average
number of secondary infections generated by a single in-
fectious individual, taking into account mixing between
age groups and subpopulations and the relative potential
contribution to transmission of all individuals in the popu-
lation. The threshold (Rn*) equals 1 for any R0, serotype,
setting, or point in time [4, 19], such that if Rn > 1, then
each new infection generates at least one new infection
and transmission of existing or imported poliovirus can
continue, but if Rn < 1 for a long enough period of time
then transmission eventually dies out.
To explore SIA vaccine choices in the northwest
Nigeria DEB model, we adopt all inputs from the most
recent model update [4, 19]. This includes assumed con-
tinuation of the status quo of 9 annual SIAs until
globally-coordinated cessation of serotype 1 and
serotype 3-containing OPV (OPV13 cessation) on April
1, 2019. The model further assumes OPV2 cessation on
April 1, 2016, which switches RI and SIAs from tOPV to
bOPV. Given very low RI coverage (i.e., of 26.4 %,
22.2 %, 18.1 %, and 13.9 % with dose 0 (i.e., birth), 1, 2,
and 3, respectively as of 2013) [23], uncertainty about
timing, and scale of IPV use going forward, we previ-
ously demonstrated very limited impact of IPV on popu-
lation immunity and cVDPV risks in settings like
northwest Nigeria [3, 5, 6]. Consequently, we do not in-
clude IPV use in the northwest Nigeria DEB model, al-
though Nigeria began introducing it in SIAs in some
limited areas. We report Rn as a function of time for dif-
ferent options that use tOPV for between 0 and 9 of the
annual SIAs between January 1, 2015 and OPV2 cessa-
tion. To spread out the impact of tOPV SIAs over the
year while concentrating as many tOPV SIAs as possible
in the months before OPV2 cessation on April 1, 2016,
we change successive SIAs from bOPV to tOPV in the
following order: March, November, August, January,
May, December, June, September, April. For example,
the option of 3 annual tOPV SIAs implies tOPV use
during the March, November, and August SIAs.
The global model divides the world into 710 subpopu-
lations of approximately 10 million people in 2013 and
uses the DEB model to track infections and population
immunity to transmission in each subpopulation [20].
The global model groups each subpopulation into 9 glo-
bal regions consisting of variable numbers of epidemio-
logical blocks that in turn consist of 10 subpopulations
of equal size to simulate random exportations from sub-
populations to other subpopulations in the same block
(i.e., representing 96 % of all exportations) or other
blocks (i.e., representing 4 % of all exportations, includ-
ing 3.5 % within the same region and 0.5 % elsewhere).
As in the DEB model, cVDPVs can emerge endogenously
if population immunity to transmission becomes low
enough as long as OPV virus from immunization (in-
cluding RI) or importations transmit in any subpopula-
tion. The global model characterizes other long-term
risks after OPV cessation stochastically, but given our
focus on short term population immunity to transmis-
sion we ignore those risks in this analysis. The subpopu-
lations in the global model reflect conditions related to
poliovirus transmission and vaccination similar to real
conditions that exist throughout the world and consist-
ent with available global data [24], but at a more abstract
level amenable to our global mixing characterization and
simplification of the complex RI and SIA histories in
each country [9, 20, 21]. The global model includes 4
blocks with conditions like the last 4 global reservoirs of
indigenous WPV1 and WPV3 transmission, which each
include an under-vaccinated subpopulation. These 4
subpopulations sustain WPV1 and WPV3 the longest in
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the model, and because of their very low RI coverage
and poor SIA quality they also represent the highest risk
areas of cVDPV emergence after OPV cessation.
With respect to SIAs, the global model assumes that
blocks increase the annual SIA frequency by one per
year each year until they eliminate all indigenous WPV
transmission. After elimination of all indigenous WPVs
from a block and in the absence of any detected out-
breaks, subpopulations conduct between 0 and 6 annual
preventive SIAs, depending on their RI coverage with 3
or more non-birth doses (POL3) and R0 [20]. For refer-
ence, Table 1 provides the specific SIA schedule assump-
tions. The global model assumes that between 2010 and
January 1, 2015, 2–5 annual SIAs in populations that
conduct more than 1 annual SIA use bOPV and the re-
mainder use tOPV (Table 1). We assume tOPV intensifi-
cation starts on January 1, 2015 and switches between 1
and 2 annual SIAs from bOPV to tOPV until OPV2 ces-
sation. We consider the implications of tOPV intensifi-
cation on all three serotypes by reporting the Rn of all
three serotypes at the time of OPV2 cessation with or
without tOPV intensification.
We further explore the option of simultaneously co-
ordinating cessation of all 3 OPV serotypes (OPV123
cessation) on April 1, 2019. Specifically, we compare the
Rn of each of three serotypes on April 1, 2019 for an op-
tion of continued tOPV intensification (i.e., continued
use of both tOPV and bOPV for SIAs, as specified in
Table 1) until OPV123 cessation with the corresponding
Rn for an option of exclusive tOPV use for RI and SIAs
from January 1, 2017 until OPV123 cessation. We focus
the comparison on 165 subpopulations affected by tOPV
intensification, which includes all subpopulations with a
POL3 of less than 0.9. For all options, the global model
assumes that subpopulations that used OPV-only as of
2013 add a single IPV dose co-administered with the
third non-birth OPV RI dose on January 1, 2015, con-
sistent with the current plan [1].
Table 2 summarizes our assumed take rates in the
DEB and global models along with data from the only
published clinical trials that directly compared current
bOPV and tOPV vaccines [25, 26]. The clinical trial con-
ducted in three sites in Central and Southern India re-
ports seroconversion rates for all three serotypes among
newborn children vaccinated with tOPV or bOPV at
birth and again at 30 days [25]. Table 2 reports average
per-dose take rates for tOPV and bOPV, calculated from
the cumulative seroconversion rates after 2 doses (CS2)
as 1-(1-CS2)1/2. The seroconversion rate observed for
serotype 2 in the bOPV arm of the trial may reflect a
Table 1 Planned, preventive (pSIA) SIA schedules used in the global model before and after OPV2 cessation in OPV-using blocks
after interruption of indigenous wild poliovirus transmission in each block (based on Duintjer Tebbens et al. (2015) [20])
Time period RI coverage (POL3) SIA schedule showing: vaccine (day(s) of year)
Before tOPV intensification on January 1, 2015 0.05 or 0.1 tOPV (0, 40); bOPV (80, 140, 240, 300)
0.3 tOPV (0, 40); bOPV (80, 140, 240)
0.6 (R0≤ 10) tOPV (0); bOPV (60, 120)
0.6 (R0 > 10) tOPV (0, 40); bOPV (80, 140, 240)
0.9 tOPV (0)
0.98 (R0 ≤ 10) No SIAs
0.98 (R0 > 10) tOPV (0)
During tOPV intensification (January 1, 2015 to April 1, 2016) 0.05 or 0.1 tOPV (0, 40, 80, 300); bOPV (140, 240)
0.3 tOPV (0, 40, 80); bOPV (140, 240)
0.6 (R0≤ 10) tOPV (0, 60); bOPV (120)
0.6 (R0 > 10) tOPV (0, 40, 80); bOPV (140, 240)
0.9 tOPV (0)
0.98 (R0 ≤ 10) No SIAs
0.98 (R0 > 10) tOPV (0)
After tOPV intensification (April 1, 2016 to OPV13 cessation) 0.05 or 0.1 bOPV (0, 40, 80, 140, 240, 300)
0.3 bOPV (0, 40, 80, 140, 240)
0.6 (R0≤ 10) bOPV (0, 60, 120)
0.6 (R0 > 10) bOPV (0, 40, 80, 140, 240)
0.9 bOPV (0)
0.98 (R0 ≤ 10) No SIAs
0.98 (R0 > 10) bOPV (0)
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small heterologous serological response, or more likely
represents secondary exposure to serotype 2 OPV virus
given the intensity OPV exposure in India [27]. The
study results translate into a relative reduction of ap-
proximately 35 % in the average per-dose individual take
rate for tOPV compared to bOPV after two doses (both
administered at an age of some partially reduced suscep-
tibility due to maternal antibodies) [28]. However, a re-
cent study that compared bOPV, mOPV1, and tOPV in
different schedules in Bangladesh suggests that the dif-
ference becomes smaller with subsequent doses, because
serotype 2-interference with serotype 1 and 3 serocon-
version decreases as individuals become better protected
to serotype 2 [26]. For a standard schedule of three
doses at 6, 10, and 14 weeks of age, the reduction in the
average per-dose individual seroconversion rates for
serotypes 1 and 3 (calculated from the cumulative sero-
conversion rates after 3 doses (CS3) assuming 1-(1-
CS3)1/3) amounted to only approximately 20 % for tOPV
compared to bOPV. Figure 1 summarizes the results
from a 1989 Brazil tOPV seroconversion study [29] that
confirms that few children seroconvert to serotypes 1
and 3 after the first dose, while more than half serocon-
vert to serotype 2 (Fig. 1a). However, once the majority
of children acquire immunity to serotype 2 after the first
dose, serotype interference diminishes, resulting in in-
creased serotype 1 and 3 seroconversion for subsequent
doses. Consequently, the differences in cumulative sero-
conversion rates between serotype 3 and serotype 2 de-
crease with each successive dose, and those between
serotype 1 and serotype 2 almost disappear altogether
after 4 doses (Fig. 1b). While the numerical results will dif-
fer in places other than Brazil due to environmental and
other factors [30], we should similarly expect increased
serotype 1 and 3 seroconversion with successive tOPV
doses as children develop serotype 2 immunity. This
means that for populations, which include a mixture of in-
dividuals with different ages and immunization and expos-
ure histories, assumptions about the overall take rate of
the different serotypes must recognize that only a small
fraction of tOPV SIA recipients did not previously sero-
convert to serotype 2. Thus, the receipt of bOPV as a first
dose instead of tOPV as a first dose for bOPV SIAs only
leads to serotype 1 or 3 seroconversion instead of serotype
2 seroconversion for a relatively small fraction of the
population.
Taking into account the average effect on take of mul-
tiple tOPV doses, our model assumes closer average per-
dose take rates for serotypes 1 and 3 bOPV and tOPV
than observed after 2 doses for very young children in
the controlled trial in India (Table 2) [25], but similar
relative average per-dose take rates as found in Bangladesh
after 3 bOPV vs. tOPV doses [26]. For the northwest
Nigeria DEB model, the estimates in Table 2 produce
serotype-specific incidence results consistent with the evi-
dence [4, 6, 9, 17, 19]. For the integrated global model, we
extrapolated from the northwest Nigeria model and
models from other situations, including northern India [5,
9, 17, 19], to assign take rate tiers for different blocks. To
explore the impact of differences between tOPV and
bOPV serotype 1 and 3 takes rates as large as reported
after 2 doses in the clinical trial in India [25], we perform
Table 2 Serotype-specific average per-dose take rates for tOPV and bOPV determined in the clinical trials that compared both
vaccines, and assumed in the DEB and global models
Setting tOPV serotype bOPV serotype
1 2 3 1 2 3
Clinical trials
Central and Southern India [25], 2 doses at 0 and 30 days of age 0.39 0.70 0.31 0.62 0.06 0.49
Bangladesh [26], 3-doses at 6, 10, and 14 weeks of age) 0.57 0.65 0.51 0.70 0.06 0.65
Calibrated DEB model within ranges from literature [17, 21]
Northwest Nigeria [4, 6, 9, 17, 19] 0.45 0.70 0.35 0.54 0 0.54
Northern India [5, 9, 17, 19] 0.35 0.60 0.27 0.42 0 0.42
Global model assumptions based on calibrated DEB model [20]
Lowest tier (e.g., Northern India) 0.35 0.60 0.27 0.42 0 0.42
Second tier (e.g., Northern Pakistan) 0.40 0.65 0.32 0.50 0 0.50
Third tier (e.g., Northwest Nigeria) 0.45 0.70 0.35 0.54 0 0.54
Fourth tier (e.g., Brazil) 0.50 0.72 0.40 0.60 0 0.60
Fifth tier (e.g., Philippines, Turkey) 0.55 0.73 0.45 0.70 0 0.70
Sixth tier (e.g., Russia, middle-income China) 0.60 0.74 0.50 0.75 0 0.75
Seventh tier (e.g., upper-income China, Israel) 0.65 0.75 0.55 0.80 0 0.80
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a sensitivity analysis that uses the observed average per-
dose rates as estimated from these data in Table 2 instead
of our calibrated model estimates.
Results
Figure 2 shows population immunity to transmission of
each serotype between 2015 and 2018 for different SIA
vaccine choices in the northwest Nigeria model [4, 6, 9,
17, 19]. Higher Rn values indicate more potential trans-
mission per new infection and they correspond to lower
population immunity (i.e., higher risk of transmission).
Despite the assumed lower average per-dose serotype 1
and 3 take rates for tOPV compared to bOPV (Table 2),
the high number of SIAs containing serotype 1 and 3
OPV results in very similar population immunity to
transmission for serotype 1 and 3 regardless of the num-
ber of tOPV and bOPV SIAs (note the similarity of all
curves Fig. 1a, c). Consequently, as long as northwest
Nigeria maintains the same quality and frequency of
SIAs [4], serotype 1 and 3 population immunity to trans-
mission remain far enough below the threshold to
minimize the risk of re-established WPV transmission
from imported WPV or continued undetected WPV cir-
culation [19], regardless of the proportion of the SIAs
Fig. 1 tOPV response to the three serotypes, by number of doses, in a clinical trial in Brazil, 1989[30]. a Marginal seroconversion rates, defined as
the incremental number of children seroconverting after each dose, divided by the number of children that did not yet seroconvert prior to the
dose. b Relative cumulative tOPV seroconversion rates, defined as cumulative seroconversion rate for the given serotype after the given number
of doses, divided by cumulative seroconversion rate for serotype 2 after the same number of doses
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using tOPV or bOPV. In contrast, given that bOPV does
not provide any immunity against serotype 2, the
number of tOPV SIAs greatly influences population im-
munity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission (Fig. 1b).
Specifically, for 3 or fewer annual tOPV SIAs between
January 1, 2015 and the time of planned OPV2 cessation,
population immunity to transmission at the time of
OPV2 cessation does not become high enough to pre-
vent cVDPV2 emergence after OPV2 cessation and/or to
interrupt cVDPV2 transmission before OPV2 cessation.
Due to the cVDPV2 outbreak that occurs with 3 or
fewer annual tOPV SIAs, during 2017 the resulting
viral circulation leads Rn to decrease (i.e., population
immunity to transmission increases due to cVDPV2
transmission) despite no OPV2 use, which represents
a failure associated with OPV2 cessation that will re-
quire outbreak response. With 4 or more annual
tOPV SIAs, Rn continues to increase after OPV2 ces-
sation because OPV2 use stops and all serotype 2
LPV transmission dies out during 2016. Prevention of
cVDPV2s clearly represents the better option for




Fig. 2 Population immunity to transmission in northwest Nigeria for all 3 serotypes and different annual numbers of bOPV and tOPV SIAs. a
Population immunity to serotype 1 poliovirus transmission. b Population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission. c Population immunity
to serotype 3 poliovirus transmission
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for serotype 2 from a health perspective and in the
context of managing global cVDPV2 risks, and this
analysis demonstrates that tOPV vs. bOPV vaccine
choices matter.
Figure 3 shows the population immunity results if the
difference between average per-dose tOPV and bOPV
take rates for serotypes 1 and 3 become as large as ob-
served in the clinical trial in India after 2 doses
(Table 2), thus assuming the entire population behaves
like the limited population in the trial [25]. For serotype
2, the results do not change at all, because the serotype
2 tOPV take rate remains unchanged (Fig. 3b). For se-
rotypes 1 and 3, the gap between the population im-
munity to transmission curves during 2015 and 2016 in
Fig. 3a, c increases somewhat compared to those in
Fig. 2a, c. However, the difference in population im-
munity to transmission remains significantly smaller
than for serotype 2. Moreover, population immunity to
transmission remains high enough to prevent re-




Fig. 3 Same model result as in Fig. 2, but with tOPV and bOPV take rates calculated directly from cumulative 2-dose seroconversion estimates
reported by Sutter et al. (2010)[27] (see Table 1). a Population immunity to serotype 1 poliovirus transmission. b Population immunity to serotype
2 poliovirus transmission. c Population immunity to serotype 3 poliovirus transmission
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and 2016. After OPV2 cessation, the curves become
similar again due to bOPV-only use for all options,
which prevent cVDPVs of serotypes 1 and 3 after
OPV13 cessation (not shown).
Figure 4 shows the results for different SIA vaccine
choices in the global model [20]. The results confirm the
observations from northwest Nigeria on a global scale.
Comparison of options with more tOPV use to options
with more bOPV use until OPV2 cessation (i.e., No
tOPV intensification vs. tOPV intensification) shows
minimal impacts on population immunity to transmis-
sion of OPV of serotypes 1 and 3, with the Rn values in
all subpopulations remaining very close to the line indi-
cating no difference between the two policies (Fig. 4a).
However, for OPV serotype 2, Fig. 4a shows higher
Rn values in all subpopulations without tOPV
intensification, implying a higher risk of cVDPV2
outbreaks after OPV2 cessation. Without tOPV in-
tensification, although the Rn values remain below 1
at OPV2 cessation, they increase after OPV2 cessa-
tion, allowing transmission of increasingly more
transmissible OPV-related viruses. This leads to
cVDPV2 outbreaks after OPV2 cessation in the glo-
bal model without tOPV intensification that do not
occur with tOPV intensification [20]. Fig. 4b shows
that even exclusive tOPV use for all SIAs does not
significantly reduce population immunity to transmis-
sion of OPV serotypes 1 and 3, while it results in a
further marginal increase in population immunity to
transmission of OPV serotype 2 compared to continued
tOPV intensification. Figure 4b assumes hypothetical sim-
ultaneous cessation of all 3 OPV serotypes (i.e., OPV123
a
b
Fig. 4 Net reproduction number (Rn) for OPV of each serotype for different SIA vaccine choices in 165 subpopulations affected by tOPV intensification
in the global model [21] . a Comparison of Rns at time of OPV2 cessation on April 1, 2016. b Comparison of Rns at time of hypothetical OPV123
cessation on April 1, 2019
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cessation) in 2019 and does not lead to cVDPV outbreaks
of any type after OPV123 cessation for either of the op-
tions. The absence of cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks re-
lates to the relatively lower R0 values for OPV serotypes 1
and 3 and their slower evolution to fully-reverted VDPVs
[9, 17, 22], which results in faster die-out of serotypes 1
and 3 OPV-related viruses compared to serotype 2 OPV-
related viruses for any given population immunity level.
However, as with OPV2 cessation, continued SIAs with
OPV containing serotypes 1 and 3 up until OPV13 cessa-
tion remain necessary in populations with low RI coverage
to prevent subsequent cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks.
Discussion
Misplaced focus on vaccine failure and on vaccine-
induced population immunity to disease [11, 13] continues
to allow insufficient focus on the failure to vaccinate and
the importance of managing population immunity to
transmission of all three serotypes [2, 14, 16, 17]. Failing
to achieve and maintain high population immunity to
transmission leads to outbreaks and delays both WPV
eradication and successful OPV cessation, which increases
the overall costs of polio eradication. The complexity of
simultaneously managing all 3 poliovirus serotypes re-
quires sufficient use of poliovirus vaccine containing all 3
serotypes (i.e., tOPV or IPV). For countries with condi-
tions conducive to intense transmission (e.g., high R0,
relatively poor hygiene, and frequent fecal-oral contacts),
even high coverage RI with IPV - only may prove insuffi-
cient to prevent transmission [10, 16]. Although the rela-
tively lower individual take rates for serotypes 1 and 3 for
tOPV compared to bOPV may suggest a benefit associated
with preferentially using bOPV for SIAs [25, 26], our re-
sults demonstrate the importance of the serotype 2 com-
ponent in tOPV and the relatively small impact on
population immunity to transmission of using bOPV for
SIAs instead of tOPV. Moreover, with repeated tOPV im-
munizations, recipients develop serotype 2 immunity,
which reduces serotype interference and makes subse-
quent tOPV doses de facto bOPV doses. Immunization
leaders need to focus on all three poliovirus serotypes to
appropriately manage the risks of both WPV eradication
and OPV cessation in the polio endgame. Our analyses
suggest that all countries performing polio SIAs should
use tOPV up until the time of OPV2 cessation, after which
time they should continue to use the OPV vaccine formu-
lation with all remaining serotypes until coordinated
global cessation of those serotypes as they manage popula-
tion immunity to transmission.
While our model insights remain very robust to a
range of assumptions about the differential impact of
tOPV and bOPV on serotype 1 and 3 take rates, we note
several limitations. First, the model does not explicitly
characterize serotype interference but instead focuses on
average per-dose take rates. However, using first-dose
take rates instead would artificially decrease the impact
of tOPV on serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission,
particularly in the context of frequent immunization
contacts associated with either good RI coverage, or fre-
quent SIAs, or both. The large difference associated with
first-dose take rates would only apply in a situation in
which children receive only one effective dose. Second,
our model relies on sets of generic model inputs based
on an expert literature review process [22, 28, 31] that
fits the evidence across a wide range of situations [9, 17]
but that does not preclude the possibility that other
combinations of generic model inputs may produce re-
sults overall consistent with the evidence. For example,
the kinetics of waning remain uncertain and intestinal
immunity may wane more steeply after 5 or more years
[32] than assumed in our model [17] based on the lim-
ited evidence [28, 31, 33], which would result in more
cVDPV emergences and cases both before and after
OPV2 cessation. Thus, further empirical evidence and
study of model uncertainties would further help inform
decisions. Using different take rates (Fig. 3) than those
based on the model calibration process led to some
changes in the historical fit, and we did not explore the
impact of take rates that vary by dose given that this
would add significant complexity to the model (i.e.,
stratification of the model by dose histories in addition
to immunity state, reversion stage, age group, serotype,
and waning stage) without good data to support dose-
specific take rate estimates in different settings. Never-
theless, the insights with respect to bOPV vs. tOPV in
the context of repeated SIAs proved robust to the alter-
native assumptions about average per-dose take rates vs.
the higher serotype interference associated with the first
two doses, and we likewise expect robustness of the in-
sights to different potential combinations of generic
model inputs that remain consistent with the body of
evidence on poliovirus immunity and transmission [28].
Third, the situation in northwest Nigeria or elsewhere
may change in the future, particularly related to the con-
firmed cVDPV2 case reported in May 2015 [34], which
should motivate Nigeria to use tOPV for more SIAs. If
SIA frequency and/or quality decrease going forward, re-
emerging WPV transmission may occur, cVDPV2 trans-
mission may not stop even with four annual tOPV SIAs,
or cVDPVs could emerge after OPV cessation. Fourth, for
the northwest Nigeria model, we did not model the evolv-
ing policies involving IPV SIAs, given their uncertain role
in the immunization program. Studies on the impact of
IPV SIAs on population immunity to poliovirus transmis-
sion of all three serotypes remains a topic of further re-
search. Finally, all limitations associated with the models
used in this analysis apply, and we refer to other publica-
tions for further discussion of those limitations [9, 20].
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Conclusions
Using tOPV instead of bOPV for SIAs leads to a min-
imal decrease in population immunity to transmission
for serotypes 1 and 3, but a significantly higher popula-
tion immunity to transmission for serotype 2. Failure to
use tOPV in enough SIAs results in cVDPV2 outbreaks
after OPV2 cessation in both the northwest Nigeria
model and the global model. Immunization leaders need
to focus on all three poliovirus serotypes to appropri-
ately manage the risks of OPV cessation in the polio
endgame. Focusing on population immunity to transmis-
sion to manage pre-OPV cessation risks of cVDPVs, all
countries performing poliovirus SIAs should use tOPV
up until the time of OPV2 cessation, after which time
they should continue to use the OPV vaccine formula-
tion with all remaining serotypes until coordinated glo-
bal cessation of those serotypes.
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